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SUPREME

COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES.-The

Hon. ROB.

ERT C. GRIER, of Pennsylvania. having resigned his seat, after a
service of nearly twenty-five years, his late brethren addressed
the following letter to him, the sentiments of which have the hearty
concurrence of the entire American bar.
SUPREME COURT

ROOM,

Washington, January 31,1870.
DEAR BROTHER: Your term of judicial service as a justice of

the Supreme Court of the United States will close to-day by your
resignation. We cannot permit an event so interesting to pass
without expressing to you something of the feeling which it excites
in us, for some of us have been long associated with you, and though
the association of others has been for briefer periods, we all honor
and love you. Almost a quarter of a century ago you brought to
the labors of the court a mind of great original vigor, endowed with
singular powers of apprehension and discrimination, enriched by
profound knowledge of the law, and prepared for the new work
before you by large experience in a tribunal of which you were the
sole judge.
Already you possessed the esteem, the respect, and the entire
confidence of the bar and the suitors who frequented your court
and of the people among whom you administered justice. Transferred to a more conspicuous position, you wore larger honors. The
sentiments of the profession and of the people of a single city and
State became the sentiments of the American bar and of the whole
country. We who have been nearest you, best know how valid is
your title to this consideration and affection. With an almost intuitive perception of the right, with an energetic detestation of
wrong, with a positive enthusiasm for justice, with a broad and
comprehensive understanding of legal and equitable principles, you
have ever contributed your full share to the discussion and settlemeat of the numerous and often perplexing questions which duty
has required us to investigate and determine. This aid we grate.
fully acknowledge and can never forget, nor can we ever cease to
remember the considerate magnanimity with which you have often
recalled or modified expressions of which your own reflections have
disapproved as likely to wound unnecessarily the sensibility of your
brethren of the bench or the bar. Your eminent services as a judge
command our respect and gratitude; your magnanimity and kindness as a man, in our official and personal intercourse, have drawn
to you irresistibly our veneration and love. We deeply lament
that infirmities incident to advancing years constrain you to retire from the post you have so long and so honorably filled.
But though you will no longer actually participate in our labors
here, we trust that you will still be with us in spirit and sympathy.
We shall still seek aid from your counsels. We shall still look for
gratification from your society. May you live many years to give
us both. May every earthly blessing cheer and the assured hope of

LEGAL NOTES.

a blessed immortality, through Christ our Saviour, brighten each
year -with ever-increasing radiance.- With warm affection and
profound respect, we remain your brethren of the bench.
SALMON P. CHASE, Chief Justice.
NATHAN CLIFFORD,

SAMUEL NELSON,

F.

NOAH H. SWAYNE,

SAMUEL

MILLER,

STEPHEN J. FIELD,

DAVID DAVIS,

Associate Justices Supreme Court.
lo Hon. R. C. GRIER, Associate Justice Supreme Court of the
United States.
Washington, February1, 1870.
My DEAR BRETHREN: Your letter, read to me by the Chief
Justice last evening, quite overcame me, and I could then make io
reply. I promised to respond in writing. My pen even now cannot
express the profound emotions it awakened-sentiments of esteem
and affection toward each one of you; sentiments of regret, not
unmingled, I trust, with resignation, that increasing infirmities have
compelled our separation, and sentiments of gratitude for such a
testimonial from my brethren at the close of my long term of service. In my home in Pennsylvania, whether life belong or short,
you may rest assured I shall always cherish for each of you warm
affection and sympathy: That God's blessing may rest upon the
Supreme Court of the United States, and upon each of its members, is the fervent prayer of your late associate and brother.
R. C. GRIER.

The Hon. WILLIAM STRONG, late a justice of the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, having been appointed to the vacancy caused by
the resignation of Justice GRIER, was promptly confirmed by the
Senate and took his seat on the fourteenth day ot March. In 1857,
Mr. Strong, who had long been the leader in his portion of the
State, was, without any previous judicial experience, elected to the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and immediately took rank as one
of the ablest jurists who had ever adorned that bench. His opinions, contained in 30-59 Penn. State Reports, are an enduring
monument of profound knowledge of the law, sound judgment, accurate reasoning and clear and forcible judicial style. His transfer to the highest court in the country is in the highest degree
satisfactory to the profession in his own State, and will soon be
recognized throughout the country as a positive accession of strength
to that eminent tribunal.
The Hon. JOSEPH P. BRADLEY, of New Jersey, having been
appointed to the vacancy caused by the death of Justice WAYNE .
has been confirmedafter some delay, and has taken his seat. The
opposition in the Senate is understood to have been entirely on the
ground that be was not a resident of the circuit over which he
would probably be assigned to preside. Mr. Bradley has not, we
believe, held judicial office previously, but has long been the leader
of the New Jerseybar. And his appointment has given unqualified
satisfaction to all who, like ourselves, desire to see the bench filled
with those whose eminence is in the field of law.
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NORTH CAROLINA.-THE COLLISION BETWEEN THE BENCH AND

Bar.-On April 19, 1869, there appeared in the Daily Sentinel, a
newspaper published in Raleigh, the following article, headed
"A Solemn Protest of the Bar of North Carolina against Judicial.
Interference in Political affairs."
"The undersigned, present or former members of the bar of North
Carolina, have witnessed the late public demonstrations of political
partisanship, by the judges of the Supreme Court of the State, with
profound regret and unfeigned alarm for the purity of the future
administration of the laws of the land.
"Active and open participation in the strife of political contests
by any judge of the State, so far as we recollect, or tradition or
history has informed us, was unknown to the people until the late
exhibitions. To say that these were wholly unexpected, and that
a prediction of them by the wisest among us would have been
spurned as incredible, would not express half of our astonishment
or the painful shock suffered by our feelings when we saw the humiliating fact accomplished.
"Not only did we not anticipate it, but we thought it was impossible
to be done in our day. Many of us have passed through political
times almost as excited as those of to-day; and most of us, recently,
through one more excited; but never before have we seen the judges
of the Supreme Court, singly or en vasse, moved fromthat becoming propriety so indispensable to secure the respect of the people,
and, throwing aside the ermine, rush into the mad contest of politics under the excitement of drums and flags. From the unerring
lessons of the past we are assured that a judge who openly and
publicly displays his political party zeal, renders himself unfit to'
hold the "balance of justice," and that whenever an occasion may
offer to serve his fellow-partisans, he willyield to the temptation,
and the "wavering balance shake."
"It is a natural weakness in man that he who warmly andpub.
licly identifies himself with a political party, will be tempted to
uphold the party which upholds him, and all experience teaches
us that a partisan judge cannot be safely trusted to settle the great
principles of a political constitution, while he reads and studies
the book of its laws under the banners of a party.
"Unwilling that our silence should be construed into an indifference to the humiliating spectacle now passing around us; influenced
alone by a spirit of love and veneration for the past purity which
has distinguished the administration of the law in our State, and
animated by the hope that the voice of the bar of North Carolina
will not be powerless to avert the pernicious 'example which we
have denounced, and to repress its contagious influence, we have, under a sense of solemn duty subscribed and published this paper."
To the foregoing were signed over one hundred names, embracing many of the leading lawyers in the State. What the specific
acts of the judges were which called forth this rather severe protest, the pamphlet account does not state.
At the June term of the Supreme Court, June 8. 1869, the fol.
lowing order was made by the court:
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"The court being informed of a certain libellous publication di-

rectly tending to impair the respect due to the authority of the
Pourt, which appeared in the Sentinel, a newspaper published in
Raleigh, on the 19th of April, 1869, and is headed 'A Solemn Protest of the Bar of North Carolina,' etc., and purporting to be signed
by certain attorneys of this court, the clerk is hereby ordered to
inquire and report to the court which of the persons whose names
appear to be signed to said publication are attorneys practicing
in this court."
Thereupon the clerk reported certain names as those of gentlemen
who, as appeared by the records of the court, ,were practicing attorneys therein, and the court then made a further order, that the attorneys named therein should be "disabled from hereafter appearing as
attorneys and cunselors in the court, unless they shall severally
appear on June 15. 1869, and show cause to the contrary;" and
iburcher ordered, that a copy of the order should be served upon
the parties referred to.
This order was subsequently directed to be discharged as to any
party who should file a declaration that his name was attached to
the protest without authority, and was, in fact, only served upon
a few of the parties named.
The case of Hon. B. F. Moore, formerly attorney general of the
State, and one of the oldest members of the bar, having been
called, the following answer was filed:
"This respondent protesting that a rule which deprives him, even
temporarily, of his privilege as an attorney of said court, ought not
to have been made in his absence, without notice to him, and without affidavit or other legal proof of the facts upon which said ruld
is based, respectfully answers:
I. That he admits the signing and publishing of the paper called
'A Solemn Protest of the Bar of North Carolina against Judicial
Interference in Political Affairs,' but insists that the Supreme Court
hath no authorit in law to make, or jurisdiction to enforee, said rule.
II. Thatthe publication referred to in said rule is not libelous and
doth not tend to impair the respect due to the authority of said court.
III. And for further answer this respondent saith, that said paper
was conceived and prepared during the recent political canvass for
the Presidency, and its publication deferred until after the close of
the canvass to avof'd its having the appearance of a partisan document. He admits that his purpose was to express his disapprobation of the conduct of individuals occupying high judicial stations; yet, as an actual justice to himself against the charge made
in the rule, he not only disavows, in signing and publishing said
paper, any intention of committing a contempt of the Supreme
Court or of impairing the respect due to its authority, but on the
contrary, he avows his motive to have been to preserve the purity
which had ever distinguished the administration of justice by the
courts of this State."
On this return a motion was made to discharge the rule, and
after elaborate arguments for the respondent by Hon. W. H. Battle,
Hon. D. G. Fowle, _Hon. S. J. Person,Hon. David A. Barnes (all
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ex-judges of the Supreme Court), and Hon. W. N. H. Smith, the

motion was granted, on consideration of paragraph III. of the
answer, PEARSON, C. J., saying: "It affords every member of the
court pleasure that the respondent did not decline to make a sufficient disavowal on oath. We agree with the learned counsel that
this disavowal meets, the words of the rule; but we must say, it
seems to us in bad taste to have introduced the expression, 'he admits that his purpose was to express his disapprobation of the
conduct of individuals occupying high judicial stations.'"
"This is so vague that the Court is unable to give to it a positive meaning; and yet, it seems to imply that in taking the oath
the respondent meant something which he hesitated to express, lest
it might be taken to neutralize the legal effect of his disavowal.
The coneluding words of the oath are enough to express the purpose which the respondent avows he had in view, and the vague
words referred to may be treated as surplusage. This presented
the only difficulty to coming instantly to our conclusion, that the
disavowal is sufficient."
N w

YORK.-TtIE

LEGISLATURE

AND

SUPREME

COURT.

BREACH OF PRrVILEGE.-In January last, a subpcena was issued

by the Hon. Platt Potter. a justice of the Supreme Court, sitting
as a judge of Oyer and Terminer at Saratoga, directed to and commanding Henry Ray to appear and testify in a certain criminal
proceeding then pending before the grand jury. Mr. Ray declined
to appear, and assigned for reason that he was a member of the
Assembly of the State of New York, which was then in session
Thereupon an attachment was issued by Justice Potter against
Ray for contempt, and he was arrested and brought before the grand

jury and required to testify. The legislature appointed a committee to investigate the matter, who reported that a high breach of

the privilege of the house had been committed, and a resolution
was passed that Justice Potter be summoned to appear at the bar
of the house. On February 16, Judge Potter appeared before the
house and requested to be heard by counsel, but this being refused,

he proceeded to state his views in person. First, protesting that
as a member of the judiciary, he was a part of a co-ordinate branch
of the Government, and not answerable to the house for his judicial action whether right or wrong; he then made a strong argument to show that no breach of privilege had been committed. The

statute of New York enacts that members of the legislature "shall
be privileged from arrest on civil process," and the learned judge
argued strongly that an attachment for contempt in disobeying a
subpena to attend before a grand jury to testify in a criminal proceeding, could not be considered "civil process," within the lan-

guage of the act.

The committee submitted an elaborate report

in support of its views, and after the argument was concluded the

house passed a resolution that the action of Judge Potter was a
breach of its privilege, but that the house believed it was in the
performance of what he deemed his duty, and not with any intention to interfere with its dignity or independence.
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*NEw YoRK BAR ASSOCIATION.-In December, 1869, an address,
numerously signed by the leading lawyers of New York, was issued,
proposing some organization of the bar of that city. In pursuance
of arrangements made by a committee, a bar meeting was held
February 1, 1870, and an adjourned meeting February 15, at
which the "Bar Association of the City of New York" was formed,
with a constitution, officers and a permanent organization. The
Hon. W1LLAM M. EVARTS was elected president. The object of
the association, as set forth in the constitution, is "to maintain the
honor and dignity of the profession of the law, to cultivate social
intercourse among its members and to increase its usefulness in
promoting the due administration of justice."
The bar of New York city numbers about four thousand members, and while its leaders have always been among the ablest
lawyers in the country, yet it is undeniable that neither in learning,
ability or character, has the general standard of the bar been equal
to those of Philadelphia, Baltimore or Boston. In fact the decline
of the New York judiciary, though more widely commented upon,
was not more marked or more disastrous in its effects than the
degradation of the bar, and these unpalatable truths, and the
necessity of reform to save the bar from utter destruction, were most
eloquently and forcibly stated by the speakers at the meeting for the
organization of the association. Addresses were made by the
chairman, Edgar S. Van Winkle, Esq., Hon. Henry Nicoll, Hon.
Edwards Pierrepont, Hon. James Emott, Samuel J. Tilden, Esq..
E. W. Stoughton, Esq., D. B. Eaton, Esq., and Hon. William M.
Evarts, alluding with marked earnestness and singular unanimity
to the disastrous effects of the change, which twenty-five years ago
made the judiciary elective and substituted a short term for the
independent tenure of good behavior.
The number and character of the gentlemen present at the
meeting, and the genuine and profound interest evinced, is a certain
guarantee that the association means to accomplish a good work,
and we regard it as a subject of congratulation to the entire legal
profession that the largest and wealthiest bar in the country has
resolutely determined that its own professional character, as well
as that of its judiciary, shall be freed from future reproach.
JAMES T. BRADY.-The New York Law Institute, of which this
distinguished advocate was president at the time of his death,
ordered a marble bust, which was unveiled February 9th, before a
large meeting of the bench and bar. From the speech of Hon. J.
W. Edmonds on the occasion, we learn one fact highly honorable to
Mr. Brady, that we had not previously seen : when his brother was
raised to the bench, Mr. Bradyretired from practice in that court,
and never afterward appeared there while his brother presided.
FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS, THE RELATION BETWEEN.-No

CONFLICT Or JURISDIOIO.-In

Exparte Holman et al., before the

Suvreme Court of Iowa, the conflict of jurisdiction noticed heretoford (Am. Law Reg. Vol. 8, N. S. p. 620), has been terminated by
the decision of the full bench, reversing the order of Justice BEOK
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on habeascorpus,discharging the relators from custody ofthe United
States Marshal. The case was one of those growing out of the
county subscriptions to railroad bonds, in which the Iowa courts
hold the bonds void, but the Supreme Court of the United States,
in Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, and subsequent cases, has held
the counties liable. In April, 1863, J. Edgar Thomson, a citizen
of Pennsylvania, and a holder of bonds of Lee county, brought an
action upon his coupons, against the supervisors, in the United States
Circuit Court for Iowa, which was subsequently transferred to the
Circuit Court of Northern Illinois, which, at the October term, 1864,
rendered judgment for plaintiff. The judgment being unpaid, and
there being no property on which an execution could operate, the
United States Circuit Court of Northern Illinois, in July, 1868,
issued an alternative, and in October, a peremptory mandamus to
the supervisors of Lee county, commanding them to levy a tax to
pay the judgment. No return was made by the supervisors to
either writ, but on the day the peremptory writ was served on them,
they passed a resolntion, setting forth that prior to the commencment of the suit of Thomson in the United States Court, they or
their official predecessors had been enjoined by a decree of the
Supreme Court of Iowa (entered in June, 1863, as of December 1,
1862), from levying and collecting any taxes to pay certain railroad bonds and coupons issued by the county, among which are
those upon which Thomson recovered his judgment, and that therefore they were unable to comply with the mandate of the writ
without committing contempt of the Iowa court. The injunction
referred to had been issued to the county treasurer, etc., the official
predecessors of these relators, at the suit of certain tax-payers.
Neither Thomson nor any other bondholder was partyto that suit.
At January term, in 1869, the Circuit Court tor Northern Illinois.
on application and proof of the foregoing facts, issued an attachment against the supervisors for contempt, in disobeying the mandate of the mandamus. The opinion of DRUMMOND, J., will be
found in full in Chicago Legal News for January 16, 1869. Under
this attachment, the United States Marshal for Iowa took the
supervisors in custody, but before getting out of the State, was
served with habeas corpus, issued by Judge BECK, sitting at Chambers, who, on hearing, discharged the supervisors from custody, as
reported ante Vol. 8 p. 620. The present case was an appeal to
the court in bane, which reversed the order and remanded the
relators to the custody of the marshal. DILLON, C. J., WRIGHT
and COLE, J. J., concurred that the United States Court having
jurisdiction of Thomson's original action, had jurisdiction to issue
the mandamus and attachment founded on it, the parties and the
subject matter being before the court, its judgment could not be
inquired into on habeas corpus. If relators were not satisfied with
the correctness of the decision by the Circuit Court of Northern
Illinois, their remedy was by writ of error to the Supreme Court
of the United States. BECK, J., dissented, adhering to his former
views.
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:" I CHRISTIANITY.-THE BIBLE IN THZ PUBLI SorHooLs.-Minor
.. e al. v. 7e Board of Education of Cincinnati,in the Superior
Court of the City of Cincinnati (Feb., 1870), has attracted general
public attention from the interest of the question involved, as well
as the fullness and zeal with which it was discussed. The facts
were that the Board of Education in November, 1869, passed a
resolution in the following words:." Resolved that religious instruction and the reading-of religious books, including the Holy Bible,
.are prohibited in the common schools of Cincinnati, it being the true
object and intent in this rule to allow the children of the parents of
all sects and opinions, in matters of faith and worship, to enjoy
,alike the benefit of the common school fund." There was also a
second resolution repealing so much of the regulations as prescribed
the reading of the Bible in the opening exercises. The plaintiffs
filed a bill in the Superior Court, alleging that the said resolution
and the action of the defendants were in violation of law and against
public policy and morality, and asked an order restraining the
defendants from putting in operation the said resolution. An order
was granted and the case continued till the general term, when it
was argued before a full bench by W. M. Bamsey, Geo. B. Sage and
Rufus King Esqrs., for the plaintiffs, and by Hon. J. B. Stallo,
Hon. Geo. Hoadly, and Hon. Stanley Mathews for defendants.
The length of the arguments covering three hundred and twentyfive pages, prevents our giving even an analysis of them in this
place. The majority of the court, HAGANS and STORER, J J.,
held the resolution to be in violation of the seventh section of the
Ohio Bill of Rights, which, after declaring that all men have a
natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according
to the dictates of their own conscience, etc., continues. "Religion,
morality and knowledge, however, being essential to good government, it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to pass suitable
laws to protect every religious denomination in the peaceable
enjoyment of its own mode of public worship, and to encourage
schools and the means of instruction." The injunction was therefore made perpetual. TAFT, J., dissented, holding that the rule
was not in conflict with the bill of rights properly construed; that
the command of the Dill of rights is to the General Assembly, not
to the courts, and the only laws the General Assembly has in the
discretion committed to it, though, "suitable" for the purpose, are
the common school laws, by which the defendants are authorized
"from time to time to make such regulations for the government
and instruction of the children (in said schools), as shall appear to
them proper and expedient;" and that the court in issuing the
injunction is going beyond its proper jurisdiction, to decide a
question placed by the law within the exclusive discretion of the
defendants.
The case of course will go to the Supreme Court of Ohio.
DE ISE TO CHARITABLE USE VOID FOR
INFIDELITY. UNOERTAINTY.-In James v. Zeisweiss, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania (Jan. 1870), had to consider the effect of the follow-
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ing devise: "My real estate aforesaid shall go to and be held in fee
simple by the Infidel Society in Philadelphia, hereafter to be
incorporated, and to be held and disposed of by them for the
purpose of building a hall for the free discussion of religion and
politics, etc." The court held 1. The devise was void for remoteness, no such society being then in existence, and even should such
a corporation be erected during the continuance of the particular
estate, it would be potentia remota. 2. Where a devise is to a valid
charitable use, although of an indefinite nature, and there is a
trustee named, competent to take, and clothed with discretionary
powers, the courts will enforce it; but if no such trustee is designated, the courts of Pennsylvania will not undertake to administer
the trust. 3.In this case the trust is too indefinite ; the discretion
as to the keeping of the hall and regulating the free discussion, etc.,
must be vested in some person, and the execution of such a charity
would be foreign to the judicial function.
In placing the decision on the foregoing grounds, the court said
it did not wish to be understood as admitting that under any
circumstances such a devise would be sustained as a valid charitable use. The Constitution of Pennsylvania secures the rights of
conscience and religious liberty, but "it is in entire consistency
with this sacred guarantee, to hold that even if Christianity is no
part of the law of the land, it is the popular religion of the country,
an insult to which would be indictable as directly tending to disturb the public peace. The laws and institutions of this State are
built on the foundation of reverence for Christianity. To this extent at least, it must certainly be considered as well as settled that
the religion revealed in the Bible is not to be openly reviled, ridiculed or blasphemed, to the annoyance of sincere believers who
compose the great mass of the good people of the Commonwealth;
Updegraf v. The Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 394; Vidal v.
Girard's Executors, 2 Howard (U. S.) 198." The opinion of
the court by SHARSWOOD, J., is reported in full in the Philadel-

phia Legal Intelligencer, for January 28, 1870.
CORPORATION BONDS,

ISSUE OF NEW BOND IN PLACE OF ONE

LosT.-Mathews v. City of Lynchburg, in the District Court of
Appeals of Virginia, was a bill in chancery to compel the city to
issue a new bond in place of one that had been lost, and also to
pay interest without presentation of the coupons.

The facts were

that plaintiff was the owner of certain unregistered negotiable
coupon bonds of the City of Lynchburg, in April, 1865, when
his house in Appamattox couhty was taken possession of and
sacked by the army of Gen. Grant; that he had not since then
been able to find said bonds, nor to hear of them, though he had
advertised in the Richmond papers and given notice to the
city treasurer; and that none of the bonds or coupons had ever
been presented at the treasury for payment. The court, by
JOYNES, J., decreed, 1, That plaintiff was entitled to payment
for the coupons now due, upon giving bond of idemnity with
personal security. 2, That plaintiff was not entitled to compel the
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city to execute a new or duplicate bond, and 3, That he was entitled-to a decree for payment of the several coupons and of the
bond itself as they should severally come due, upon giving a bond
of indemnity; and that to avoid multiplicity of suits, such decree
should be made in this suit, the payments to be made upon rules
against the city from time to time, reserving to the city upon any
such rule, the right to show that the bond or coupon had been
found and presented. The plaintiff was required to apply for payment and tender indemnity before obtaining each rule.
JuRy TRIALS--CHARGING THE JuRy.-At the opening of the
Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Rhode Island,
December 28, 1869, the Hon. JOHN P. KNOWLES, District ,Judge,
took occasion, as this was the first time he had presided at a jury
trial, to express his views on the subject of the jqdge's duties in
summing up or charging the jury We make the following extract, which indicates the current of his thought:
"I, therefore, would here say, that in my view, the cases are of
rare occurrence when, in committing a case to a jury, it.is a duty
of the judge to make a new, or a full, or a partial presentment of
the case in hearing, as he may chance to view it, upon the testimony
and evidence and argument, as he shall have understood or misunderstood the one, and construed or misconstrued the other. He
listens to the evidence and the argument to the end, mainly, that
he may give to the jury the rules of law which should guide them
in deducing conclusions of fact from the evidence permitted to pass
to them As to those conclusions of fact, he is supposed to have
no opinion, prior to the rendering of the jury's verdict; and if, unhappily, he form one, he ought not, in my judgment, to disclose or
betray it, in the jury's hearing-nor, indeed, the hearing of any
one, until it shall have been settled, beyond a peradventure, that
no motion to set aside the verdict as against evidence, will be addressed to him by the losing party. A judge, sui generis,I grant
would he be, who could preside at a jury trial of a cause without
forming an opinion of its merits; but something more than a
model judge, that rarest specimen of Omnipotence's handiwork, I
submit, must he be who could, in one case in ten, recapitulate, review and comment upon the testimony in a cause without provoking from plaintiff or defendant a murmur or an exclamation
in which the significant phrase, third argument (may be with an
unseemly adjectival prefix) would be distinctly audible. It is, in
my judgment, of paramount importance, under a government of
laws like ours, of which the consent of the governed is the life and
breath, that judicial proceedings be so ordered, that parties litigant
in general shall be satisfied when judgments are rendered against
them, thatthey have had a full, fair and impartial hearing and
trial of their cause ; and my experience as a Rhode Islander is, that
here, where (with or without reason) a jury trial is more prized
than in some other sections of the country, few litigants ever are
satisfied in this regard, when a court's charge or summing up upon
the facts is intentionally or unintentionally against them."
17

LEGAL NOTES.

.While we concur most heartily with the learned judge, that a
judge should betray no opinion on the facts, and that to satisfy
the parties that their case has been impartially heard and decided,
is scarcely, if at all, less important than impartiality in fact, yet
we can hardly agree with him as to the impossibility of a judge's
attaining the power to charge impartially, and to the satisfaction of
the parties, or as to the danger of the practice, where less than absolute perfection in such matters is attained. The memory of
BUSROD WASHINGTON

is enshrined in the hearts of his profes-

sional brethren, as that of a perfect Nisi Prius judge ; though in
his charges to the jury he elaborately reviewed the facts, yet not
even counsel in the case could detect the slighest trace of his personal opinion. Perhaps there are few judges to whom this perfection would be unanimously conceded, but we think a fair approach to it is attainable by any one of judicial temperament who
earnestly makes the effort, and thejudges who fairly satisfy the best
portion of the bar in this respect, are more numerous than those
who do not.
The danger that jurors will not listen to evidence, but depend
entirely on the charge they know is to come, is not, in our opinion,
to be weighed at all against the undue advantage that the absence
of a full charge gives to the counsel who closes the case.
PRIVILEGED COMIMUNICATION, SUBPENA DUCES TECUM. DOCUMENTS IN RELATION TO PARDONS ON FILE IN THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMIENT.- The People of Illinois v. Rummel, in the Recorder's

Court of Chicago (Feb., 1870), was a motion for an attachment
against the defendant, the Secretary of State of Illinois, for noncompliance with asubpenaducestecum. The facts were thatcomplaint having been made before the grand jury against several citizens of Chicago, for an alleged libel contained in a petition signed
by said citizens and presented to the governor, asking for commutation of the sentence of a prisoner under sentence of death, a subpoena was issued and served upon the defendant, commanding him
to produce the said petition before the grand jury. This defendant
declined to do. The court by MCALLISTER, J., refused the attachment, holding 1, That the court ought to look into the character of
the document sought to be obtained by the subpoena, citing Rex
v. Dixon, 3 Burr. 1867 ; Ameg v. Long, 9 East. 473. 2, That the
petition was part of a proceeding in the regular course of justice
(though not strictly a judicial proceeding), and unless it be shown
that it contains libelous matter not pertinent to its object and inserted from malice, it was privileged and could not be made the foundation of in indictment for libel: Gilbert v. People, 1 Denio 43;
Tlorne v. Blanchard 5 Johns. 508; Vanderzee v. McGregor, 12
Wend. 545; and 3, That confidential communications tothe governor of a State, in relation to any of his duties as a public officer, are
privileged: Gray v. Pentland, 2 Serg. & Rawle 23. The opinion
in full is reported in Chicago Legal News for February 19, 1870.
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